Beforehand, UPS argues that it is entitled to judge Pennie`s ADA claims on the basis of the Estoppel principle. The Estoppel court is “a fair concept that provides that a party who imposes himself in a legal action on a merit cannot … in another appeal, reject this ground. Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 891 (7. Cir. 2005) (Quote from the United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1999). In other words, the Estoppel court prohibits an applicant who has obtained a judgment by proving a number of facts, obtaining a judgment, turning around and proving that the facts were in fact the opposite of what he had proved in the previous case.
Devine v. Bd. of Comm`rs of Elkhard County, 49 Fed. I`m appx. 57, 61 (7th Cir. 2002) (Reynolds quote vs. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2002)). UPS argues that Pennie`s assertion in this action contradicts its position in the settlement of employee compensation claims, in which Pennie would have been able to do his job as a parcel driver because of a “permanent limitation of 25 pounds sterling”. According to UPS, the high amount of the comparison, $112,314, indicates that it should compensate for a pay gap under Section 8 (d) (1) claim of the Illinois Workers` Compensation Act. (Def.s 56.1 – 40; Transaction agreement, e.g.
A to Pl.`s Resp. to Def. SJM.) Indeed, the transaction agreement refers expressly to Section 8, point d) (1), which provides, as noted above, compensation for a worker who has suffered a disability during his employment, which prevents him from continuing his current activity, and (2) reduces his ability to earn in the future. See Casens Transp. Co., 218 Iii.2d at 530-31, 844 N.E.2d at 422. Since a successful Section 8 (d) (1) claim requires proof of the applicant`s inability to return to work, UPS argues that pennie is deterred from arguing that he is a qualified person with a disability – a necessary part of his right to the ADA. Pennie and his lawyer Frank Sommario both signed the settlement agreement and it was later approved by the Illinois Industry Commission. (Def. 55.1 40-41.) UPS confirms that the Commission would not have authorized the high amount of compensation in the absence of the settlement clause for all claims covered in point 8 (d) (1).
(Pl. es Mem. at 5 a.m.) Finally, UPS argues that Pennie`s workers` compensation scheme “directly emerged from Pennie`s false 25-pound suspension limit and its silence on its actual condition in the 15 months prior to the transaction.” (Def. es Fraud Resp. at 6.) UpS` main support for this dispute was Pennie`s lawyer`s settlement letter to Liberty Mutual in May 2002, in which he sought compensation based on Pennie`s need to work in a lower-paying job because of his “significant restrictions.” (Def. 56.1s 39; e.g. 28 to Pennie Dep.) The letter does not explicitly state that the restriction is “permanent” but calls for a plan based on a permanent reduction in wages over a 25-year period. Needless to say, pennies returning to work two weeks after the healthy agreement is incompatible with such a presentation. In short, says UPS, the lifting restriction imposed on February 13, 2002 is not necessary and was never necessary, and Pennie, who was fully aware of it, nevertheless remained silent, knowing that UPS would trust the doctor`s reports and Sommario`s representations. His deliberate decision not to correct this misunderstanding allowed him to defraud UPS of 15 months of temporary total disability benefits and a settlement of approximately $112,000 for a lifetime pay gap that wanted to return to work all the time after the comparison was approved.